Global Citizenship

Study Abroad: the best choice you’ll ever make as an undergraduate—so they say.  You know, it not only takes a tremendous amount of courage to embark on such an adventure, but a tremendous capacity to open the mind to new things.  As I arrived in Paris, France January 17^th, 2009, I was a little upset that I had turned down a seat at Barack Obama’s inauguration in Washington, D.C.  While I roamed the boulevards of the city for two days, directionless and unmotivated, I was able to observe the daily comportment of French, particularly Parisian, individuals. 

Come the 20^th of January the day of inauguration, there was commotion and, to my surprise, a sentiment of excitement.  These French, who had always been accused of hating Americans, were not following the behavioral norms I had come to expect.  During the inauguration, while I sat with goosebumps listening to the first African-American president accept his duty to my homeland; I was picked up by an African-French gentleman and kissed right on the mouth.  Quite the surprise, if you ask me!  But this was more than “getting rid of Bush,” especially to the French.  This represented a shift in the ideological foundation in Washington: the emergence of youth in social change, the new role of mavericks in politics, and the capacity to change international relations instantaneously.  In the span of his roughly one hour ceremony, Obama changed the face of America.

The point to be made here is not just a numeration of implications brought on by a new world leader of a different ethnicity (although there are many), but that the French were just as involved and occupied by happenings in America as were Americans.  This is not era-specific, as the importance of international politics has existed for centuries, but it is time-sensitive.  For me, it was the awakening of a new concept: that I was a global citizen concerned with the events happening not only in my native country of the US, but with what was happening in the EU and France as I was now to be directly affected by their current affairs. 

Now while I could not directly be employed or even vote, I was still acutely aware of my many roles as an American living in Paris.  Not only was I a student representing a group of youth with investments in higher education, I was an American student studying abroad representing an investment in foreign culture.  It was through an open-minded demeanor and international interest that I was able to converse with like-minded Parisians and Parisians who opposed many of the ideals and beliefs that I held and still hold dear. In discovering my position in a global society, I came in contact with many ideologies and paradigms of thinking.

This could be a core component to the meaning of global citizenship: understanding the microcosm of my world in the context of internationalism and globalization. Because some of my courses actually focused on these as topics, such as the “Economics of the European Union” and the “History of Islamic Art,” I was able to constantly be reminded of greater affairs and international perceptions of things that before, I had only seen from the American— or democratic or capitalistic— viewpoint.  From studying the formation of the EU, a greater political body monitoring many sovereign nations, to the transmission of cultural advancements across Orient to the Middle East, and lastly to Occident, I was able to see that the unquestioned importance of the US hegemony in the world no longer existed in my mind. 

I started to question many things at this point and was even able to discover a relatively new field within the study of economics.  I was fortunate to have the opportunity to study at French universities in Paris (specifically Sorbonne and L’Institut Catholique de Paris) and take courses in economics at these institutions.  It was in a “Contemporary Economics” course that I read the works (Vers un Nouveau Capitalisme) of Mohammad Yunus, an academic and self-proclaimed banker to the poor.  Never in American economic curricula had I found this particular theory of social business presented.  I was immediately excited at my discovery or rather new found interest, but concerned for the quality and breadth of American economic programs and their implied narrow-mindedness.  I was thrilled to see that other political systems and financial systems could adapt the concept of capitalism to fit their structural framework and political establishment.  Furthermore I was directed towards a field in which I hope to pursue a career. 

Without these sorts of realizations, understandings of the real world and its workings, I would be back where I started.  By having the opportunity to live in another country, live in another culture and assimilate into it as best I could, I was able to redefine my role as an American living in the world, and as an American living in America. 

When I had arrived in France, a friend of mine, who is French and who had recently moved to Paris, asked me, “Do you feel proud when you see your flag?”  I had answered her blandly saying, “No, not yet at least…” because I was embarrassed of America’s reputation [at the time].  It was not until I reached Normandy, months later, that I saw my flag waving on soil that had been given from the French to America (at Omaha Beach).  It was then that I realized that I was so proud of my country that I could not conceive it.  I was proud of my inherent civil rights guaranteed to me by my constitution and citizenship; I was proud of the oppression and evil that the US helped to destroy during WWII (though who knows if it created it during the post-WWI era); and I was proud to represent a global subculture of people who espouse the equality of all people and right to pursue life, liberty, and happiness.  It becomes painfully obvious as one travels more and more that these privileges that I so often take advantage of or that I rarely even think of are notrights for most of the global population. 

Turning here from my personal epiphanies to the role of globalization and global status within the French (again, specifically Parisian) society, I hope to offer some basic observations of my experience.  Simply speaking, it is obvious that globalization has enormously affected not only France, but Paris.  Walking around the winding boulevards and rues of Paris, I was able to see Pfizer (which was right down the street from my apartment), Coca Cola, Cisco, AT&T, J.P. Morgan, Pricewaterhouse Coopers Audit, Microsoft, as well as hundreds of other American based or American oriented firms.  Much employment and international business is done between Paris and countries all over the world.  Paris is increasingly experiencing an augmentation in migration, with larger and larger numbers from Arab countries or North African nations.  Aside from French, I heard Arabic on a regular basis; and if I stayed in the 14^th arrondissement (in the south part of Paris proper), I barely heard any English. 

When moving from Paris to the whole country of France, the impact of globalization becomes even more apparent.  The last 50 years has represented the most liberal period for French in terms of internationalism.  The growth and development of the EU has transcended national frontiers to establish a rapport between Europeans as a collective group in an increasingly competitive global environment.  The Schengen Agreement allows for the free movement of labor across borders of any country within the EU, which means that there are more and more ethnicities and nationalities throughout the whole of France.  While in Nice and Monaco I was able to meet many people of Arab descent and while in England I actually made friends with several French and German girls. 

As a matter of fact, it was in Nice that my two friends and I, during spring “holiday,” decided to dine Moroccan.  As it was in the reputable French Riviera, we trusted the authenticity.  We spoke polite French with our garçon, saying “please” and “thank you” as one would expect.  It was then that the man, who happened to be the owner, stopped his service and sat down with us.  Actually he got us some small cakes and warm green tea first, but nevertheless…He told us to treat him, to treat any foreigner we encounter, with the same rapport and behavior as we would in our own country.  He told us that he would enjoy a broken conversation given in a good humor above cold, yet polite utterances dictated by perceived modern norms.   It was then that we broke the ice and he showed us his restaurant, brought out his kanun and played it singing in Arabic, wrote our names in calligraphy (the highest of arts in Islam), and welcomed us into his hospitality.  We never acted the same in a restaurant afterwards.

                Not all aspects of globalization and in the previous case—aspects of increased acceptance of internationalism—are so positive.  The economic crisis and eventual recession caused much discussion and melee among the French press and ordinary citizens.  It was obvious that greedy American consumption annoyed the French and that the repercussions they felt, in a socialist regime, [which regime is this?] would be of a longer duration and of a potential greater magnitude.  The actions of Americans and American banks affected millions of non-Americans.  As my “Economics of the EU” course picked up more and more the current events in the newspapers, we were able to analyze the consequences of globalization; between nations and between greater political/financial bodies.   The EU couldn’t agree on the true definition of chocolate—should it be Belgian or should it be Cadbury (English)?  The EU and the US couldn’t agree (and still cannot) on international agricultural regulations and standards—which pathogen reduction treatment should the US adopt that the EU will allow?  France even threatened to walk out of the G20 summit if its requests were not met—where does the meaning of negotiation or multilateral discussion go when this occurs?  France, Italy, Germany, and numerous other countries tried to adopt protectionist policies—is this not the complete reversal of the principles of globalization?  I gave a presentation on the new wave of economic nationalism in my “Contemporary Economics” class—highlighting the negative repercussions in a world that continues to globalize regardless of individual country’s behavior.   

France, one of the most developed of the European nations and one of the leaders of the EU, experienced political and economic tension just as the US did—in the name of a globalized and highly interdependent world.  The affairs of multiple nations became and are still becoming so intertwined the hazy line of civic proprietorship, whether in capital or intellectual property, is becoming impossible to distinguish.  Cultures are mixed; economies are inter-reliant.  Beyoncé and Chris Brown performed in Paris while Sarkozy vacationed in the US.  China and India are starting to compete with advanced economies.  While I know that I am certainly an American among all of the confusion, I personally find it more intriguing the continue exploring my citizenship of the globe.

Is the evolution of economics really progressive?

The world is increasingly realizing the importance of the study of economics and the true value of understanding complex market structures and interactions. Since the time of Adam Smith and the birth of the United States, economics has begun to transform into a scientific study, with overwhelming influences in political and economic policy.  However, scientific classification disputes are still widespread.  Is the study of economics a natural, social, or ethical science?  How does its nature as a science predetermine its inability to cease evolving?  The evolution of the field of economics is not synonymous with the idea of progress.  By being misconstrued as such, economic science can be misleading. 

The development of a study, such as economics, consists of a pure sequence of events as well as the global context in which these historical events occurred.  To suggest the word progress, one interprets a sort of change for the “better,” especially in a science that has social and ethical implications.  This is a normative suggestion, which breaks from the mainstream economic assumption of objectivity and therefore discredits validity.  According to modern philosophical theories, in order to deem any sort of judgment regarding progress, one must account for the nature of science and its compatibility with the study of economics.  In The Structure of Scientific Revolution, Thomas Kuhn defines the study of a science in the form of a paradigm, or an “accepted model or pattern” (Kuhn, p.23).  To Ward, the paradigm can be described as an “invisible college” or social network.  One trait of the paradigm is that historical economic developments have a cumulative effect, which involves two main elements:  the revolution and the “mop-up” work (Kuhn, p, 23-25).  Caldwell asks the question “[is] progress possible in science?” and agrees with Kuhn that a new definition of progress may be required when referring to the sciences (natural or social) (Caldwell, p. 74).  This new definition defines progress as the “evolution of the state of knowledge” (Caldwell, p.74), which Ward believes is always occurring.  He asks that “[despite] all those signs of Kuhnian normality, can it be that economics is in a state of permanent revolution, in which the tensions of unsolved problems continually percolate on the fringes of a discipline that studiously ignores them while continuing the development of its problems of detail?” (Caldwell, p.74).  Caldwell theorizes that the nature of science leads to the recognition of anomalies, therefore paradigm change, and that scientists never “reject an old paradigm without coming up with a replacement” (Caldwell, p.72).  Mitchell’s proposal then that economists can only “point out the shortcomings of individual behavior, [and] not change the behavior,” becomes very interesting (Mitchell, p. 3).  In Caldwell’s aforementioned framework, one can interpret Mitchell as saying that economists are not scientists who can invent or discover new paradigms because they can never control and change human behavior.   Therefore, they can never totally form a new paradigm as a replacement.

To continue with the idea that evolution does not equate with progress even today, the adoption of modern political economic theory and economic rationalism has not brought economists any closer to providing answers to some of the most prevalent economic problems, such as the difference between rich and poor countries.  Easterlin, in his book Growth Triumphant, proposes the happiness-income paradox as a timeless and unsolvable mystery (Easterlin, 131-144).  Since the birth of economics the income differential among societies has been an issue and was a focus for Marxism.  Historically, discontent over large income gaps has caused political and economic revolts.  As long as economies develop and change, certain human behaviors will prevent true global progression from happening.  Karl Marx once stated that “[a] house may be large or small; as long as the surrounding houses are equally small it satisfies all social demands for a dwelling.  But if a palace rises beside the little house, the little house shrinks into a hut” (Easterlin, p. 140).   Essentially this can be interpreted on a larger scale; that as economies develop into what modern political economic theory calls “developed,” human preferences will simultaneously continue to evolve.  Thus, true human satisfaction, an optimal pareto-efficient outcome, is never truly attainable.  This can be through the mechanism of association or by default due to the definition of economics (the study of how humans make choices with limited resources and unlimited wants, [Miller, p.2]).  Mitchell repeatedly insists that this very misconception of economics as a natural science prevents the academic realm from realizing the involvement of the “very unpredictable variable:” human behavior.  Hence, when human nature and the nature of economic science advance together, one cannot assume that the evolutional changes imply progress in the social network.

Generally large shifts in patterns of thinking are associated with large steps of progress.  Paradigm shifts, which “reveal the nature of things (Kuhn, p.25),” could be viewed as such, while mop-up work “is dependent […] upon a paradigm” (Kuhn, p.25).  One can view the shift from a Ptolemaic (geocentric) model to a heliocentric model of the universe as a step of evolution in astronomy as well as progress because it brought scientists closer to what is now regarded as accepted truth and is the basis for many prevailing theories.  However, science is not necessarily based upon truth, but is highly dependent upon the paradigm framework that surrounds it, and thus is not objective.  Perhaps this is why it was Copernicus and not Aristarchus who received credit for the heliocentric model.  If one regards the paradigm of natural sciences, which are highly dependent upon concrete mathematical and scientific experiments, and one assesses the variable of human volatility, it is evident that economics does not fit into one accepted paradigm.  Can a science fit into more than one paradigm?  If so, how then can a shift from one or several paradigms mark progress?   Easterlin proposes technology causes shifts in the paradigm of economics and that revolution and evolution are distinctively different (Easterlin, p. 15-29).  However, technology does not inherently affect the state of economics, rather the methodology.  Ward argues “methodological sophistication may often substitute for solution in the eyes of the most respected practitioners” (Ward, p.32).   Mankiw gives many examples of the multiple views of economics, many of which are from rivaling paradigms within the field.  He also raises the point that the inability to find one paradigm in which all economists can agree has caused economic science to come to a “truce” rather than a universal and “synthesized” paradigm.  Mankiw uses examples of conflicting views on monetary policy (and its applications), imperfect competition, and the nature of business cycles (Mankiw, p. 38-43).  In each of these specialized topics, when economists cannot explain a piece of economic phenomena or cannot wholly prove their own theory, Mankiw argues that there is not “so much a synthesis as a truce between intellectual combatants, followed by a face-saving retreat on both sides” (Mankiw, p.39).  Disregarding conflicting theories within each subtopic, one can still see the blatant existence of several paradigms within the field.  As Ward points out, micro and macro “remain two distinct theories, and from the propositions of one are not derivable from the propositions of the other” (Ward, p.38).  Perhaps this trait more than any other determines economics to be a field always in a state of evolution and never in a state of progression.  Until the day when science allows economists to successfully understand all needed variables (such as human nature), the science of economics will remain highly imperfect, working towards some final, synthesized paradigm.

The persistence of certain timeless issues, such as disease and the unequal global income distribution, presents the marked difference between progress and evolution.  While progress marks movement towards something “superior,” evolution marks change, but allows for the connotation of pure change without regard to quality.  Progress is upscale while evolution is unending and can be in any direction (such as horizontal or reversed).  Economics as a science can be frustrating because there is so much movement that is not forward progress.  Caldwell reiterates that by the nature of science, “normal science leads its practitioners to awareness of anomalies,” and thus, according to Kuhn and Ward, new paradigms are formed (Caldwell, p. 72).  However, Caldwell goes farther in stating that “a new paradigm rarely emerges in a fully articulated form,” and that they usually emerge due to more precise quantitative methodology or to provides a more aesthetic interpretation (Caldwell, p.73).  He even indicates that to choose between equally “objective methodological standards” is an act of faith.  Mankiw provides a concrete example of horizontal movement within the paradigm of macroeconomics such as in the theories of price stickiness and efficiency wages.   Paul Krugman, the winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2008, claims that new neoclassic theory may help Keynesian economists to explain and understand “how price stickiness could happen” (Krugman, p.33-42).  It does not provide a better, nor a more accepted, theory of macroeconomic phenomena.  Mankiw continues with the application of economics (from the scientist to the engineer) and asks, “Have the developments in business cycle theory over the past several decades improved the making of economic policy?” (Mankiw, p.40).  This touches the heart of the issue of progress in economics.  He claims that constant institutional change and the differences in the concept of “study verses application” in economics do not transcend into the scientific theory of economics nor are they always accounted for in its paradigm.  The application of economics in policy to initiate societal progress does not automatically take place.  “The real world of macroeconomic policymaking can be disheartening for those of us who have spent most of our careers in academia.  The sad truth is that the macroeconomic research of the past three decades has had only minor impacts on the practical analysis of monetary or fiscal policy” (Mankiw, p.42).  If theories of a science are not applied, is progress possible?  Or is there always a lag between the academic acceptance of theories and their entry into mainstream thinking?  Would the research of the past three decades even be applicable to modern times when aggregate human behavior has changed once again?  Mitchell points out that this is often seen as a “failure on the part of economics; that economics cannot always generate answers, but sometimes just more questions” (Mitchell, p.4).  Perhaps these questions can highlight why economics is constantly in a state of evolution and why it is difficult to perceive economics as progressive.  While methodology and quantification techniques may continue to qualitatively improve, if the data or objects being observed continuously change as well as the paradigm in which they exist (such as political institutions), one will never succeed in understanding completely.

The idea that economics is not progressive may seem rather pessimistic or even insulting.  Why do we continue to study it if this is the case?  By suggesting that economics is simply evolutionary and not necessarily progressive, one does not diminish its importance in the modern world.  Mitchell states that this may seemingly create failure “when failure is not the case” and that it is not the failure of a social science to only generate more questions, but that it is the nature of a social science.  In a world that continues to look to mathematics, science, and technology for the future, it is imperative to understand the constraints of certain sciences, especially those that emphasize both mathematics as well as human behavior.  It may be more difficult to understand the complexity of economics and the social sciences than to create, say, a “perpetual-motion machine” (Ward, p.3). 

 

Works Cited 

Caldwell, Bruce. Beyond Positivism: Economic Methodology in the Twentieth Century. 1982. 70-79. Print.

Easterlin, Richard A. Growth Triumphant. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1996. Print.

Gordon, Robert A. "Rigor and Relevance in a Changing Institutional Setting." American Economic Review 66.No. 1 (1976): 1-14. Print.

Hodgson, Bernard. Economics as Moral Science. Berlin: Springer, 2001. Print.

Krugman, Paul. "How Complicated does the Model have to be?" Oxford Review of

Economic Policies 16 (2000): 33-42. Print.

Kuhn, Thomas. "Chapters 3,4,5,7,8,9." The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 1962. Print.

Mankiw, N. George. "The Macroeconomist as Scientist and Engineer." Journal of Economic Perspective (2006): 29-46. Print.

Miller, Roger L. Economics Today. 15th ed. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University, 2009. Print.

Mitchell, Matt. What's Actually Wrong with Economics: Misconceptions and Unreasonable Expectations of a Social Science. Diss. The Pennsylvania State University, 2009. 1991. Print.

Ward, Ben. "Part I." What's Wrong with Economics? 1972. Print.

Implausibility of Socialism in America: One step forward, two steps back

The debate goes back to the founding days of our Forefathers—the role of government in a society of free men.  Since its birth, the U.S. ideology has shifted to and fro on the roles of political and economic freedoms and this has caused a fundamental disconnect between voting citizens and the role of their government.  While many view socialism as an attempt to create greater social and economic equality, they often do not specify whether it is the inequality of income or the inequality of opportunity that they most oppose. However, free marketers like Friedman discount the role of government in mitigating certain market failures, arguing that inequality is in fact desirable at some levels.  While the current combination of democracy and capitalism has been shifting towards a more mixed-economy form, there has been a tendency to label the economic structure as “socialism.”  This paper will attempt to enumerate implications of democratic socialism in the U.S. as a result of certain trade-offs that arise between the political and economic realms.

Socialism is an economic system in which the government owns “income-producing property” and is the “principal employer of labor” (p. 52, Okun).  A democracy is a political system that enables citizens to have an equal distribution of rights—reflected in the inherent rights specified in the Constitution and the policy of ‘one vote each’.  While Schumpeter views socialism as an inevitable result of capitalist self-destruction which will also destroy democracy, Coe and Wilber disagree in that a “democracy can survive and even thrive in a socialist state” (p.13, Coe and Wilber, 1985)¹. Assuming that the U.S. transitioned into a socialist economy, what would the expectation be?  Would all citizens be equal or better off?

The simple answer is no.  The longer answer requires that first the transition be considered and then the actual system of socialism.

In order to transform the American economy into a socialist one, the transfer of property from private ownership to state ownership must be made.  Two methods of transference can occur: either the government compensates owners at market value for their assets or it confiscates them.   Okun asserts that “[socialism] could really dent the distribution of income right from the start only if it paid owners much less than the value of their assets, or, in the extreme, confiscated with no compensation at all” (p.53, Okun, 1975).  Any economic philosopher or political scientist can attest that Americans value freedom—and confiscation or under-compensation of a citizen’s assets is an infringement on their right to property.  He defines economic freedom as “a component of freedom broadly understood” (p.8, Friedman, 1962).  And he continues that “freedom as a value in this sense has to do with the interrelations among people” (p.12, Friedman, 1962).   Therefore free men face the ethical challenges of inequality—but to redistribute welfare (in this case assets, to create an equal ‘starting point’) would infringe upon political freedoms.

From this trade-off the notion of having either maximum economic efficiency or maximum social welfare is born.  Socialism opts for the maximum amount of social welfare in lieu of certain economic efficiencies.  Alleged inefficiencies could refer to the economy following the preferences of “central planners” and not consumers, the inability to measure and track measured real GNP, the distribution and production of knowledge (lack of incentive for innovation and investment in knowledge), high costs of bureaucracy, or any combination of these factors (p.51-61, Okun, 1975). 

Combining a political system designed to have complete equality of rights (and purportedly of opportunity) with a competitive capitalist economy will protect individuals’ freedoms—a concept deeply engrained in the American psyche.  However, this paradigm change to socialism will uproot and distort this belief by infringing on personal freedoms for group welfare.  Whether we deem this as ethically tolerable, the political sphere must adapt accordingly—and at this point, with the will of the people.  This equates to citizens deciding upon fewer political freedoms at the expense of economic equality. 

To no longer have certain political freedoms due to a movement towards economic equality will greatly impact the level and desire to engage in innovation and entrepreneurship.  Schumpeter’s crude acknowledgement and pessimistic ruin of capitalism sprung from social factor and it would not “fail on strictly economic grounds” (p.8, Coe and Wilber, 1985).  However, there are certain economic factors that would diminish under socialism, such as the incentive of great profits for innovation. It is the bourgeois class that instills a spirit of innovation and the principle of creative destruction.  As Okun bluntly states:

Indeed, unless special legal provisions make it feasible, the protection of private property rights in knowledge and information is inherently difficult; in the absence of laws establishing patents, copyrights, and authorizations for industrial secrecy, there would be little scope for profit by inventors, authors, and idea producers.  And hence there would be little market incentive to invest in the production of knowledge (p.58, Okun, 1975).

 

Some social incentive may exist to increase investment in knowledge; however relying upon the charity of humanity has proven ineffective as “men [are] imperfect beings” (p.12, Friedman).  Coe and Wilber point out that even in the lack of capitalism, “market-type economic arrangements” have been scarce among socialism societies (p.22, Coe and Wilber, 1985).  In the reality of capitalism, “it is not the kind of competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity…competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives” (p.84, Schumpeter, 1942).  This sort of competition is one factor in what has given rise to such great innovation and achievement since the industrial revolution.  To take away the risky nature of entrepreneurship and the incentive of profit rewards, innovation and investment would be highly impacted.

Not only would lack of innovation affect economic growth in the long-run, but labor market allocations would manifest ineffective productivity in the short-run.  Because the state would be the owner of labor (in economic literary terms) and equally distribute all labor incomes, “it is doubtful” this would occur “unless the free choice of jobs were eliminated” (p 54, Okun, 1975).  Furthermore, Okun presents the question of trade-offs between economic incentives and productive efficiency by highlighting the lack of willingness to expend effort in the face of equal wages despite productive contribution (p.42-43, Okun, 1975). 

Many issues face the current system in the U.S. and as the current paradigm meshes the economic and political realms closer and closer, one needs to step back and look in the direction in which it is headed.  A mixed economy implies greater social equity and government intervention (for market failures and redistribution), yet socialism entails something greater.  It implies that certain political rights will be lost in the transition of economic systems; that certain inefficiencies will exist even in the new system (as enumerated upon above); that innovation would be hampered by lack of economic incentives; and that job choice would effectively be eliminated.  Until the political realm is willing to deal with these consequences and spell out the daunting translations of such policy for the American people, few citizens need to worry about Obama and the democrats “turning us socialist” (Yang, 2009). 

Footnote:

¹ Schumpeter asserts a definition of democracy that includes an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (p.250, Schumpeter).   Coe and Wilber consider Schumpeter’s view too narrow in that democratic politicians also “shape and guide the ‘will of the people’” (p.13, Coe and Wilber, 1985).

 

Works Cited:

Coe, Richard D., and Charles K. Wilber. "Schumpeter Revisited: An Overview." Capitalism and Democracy: Schumpeter Revisited. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985. 1-34. Print.

Friedman, Milton. "Introduction." Capitalism and Freedom. 1962. 1-36. Print.

Okun, Arthur. "Equality of Income and Opportunity." Equality and Efficiency. 1975. 65-87. Print.

Okun, Arthur. "Equality of Income and Opportunity." Equality and Efficiency. 1975. 32-64. Print.

Okun, Arthur. "Increasing Equality in an Efficient Economy." Equality and Efficiency. 1975. 88-120. Print.

Okun, Arthur. "The Case for the Market." Equality and Efficiency. 1975. 32-64. Print.

Schumpeter, Joesph. "The Process of Creative Destruction." Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York, 1942. 81-86. Print.

Yang, Carter. "Napolitano Not Talking 'Terror'" CBS News. CBS News Interactive Inc., 26